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croatian Politics in the austro-hungarian monarchy before the War
from the beginning of the twentieth century to the beginning of World 
War I Croatian political and social life was marked by following characteris-
tics: the end of tenure of Károly Khuen-Hedérváry as Ban of Croatia-Slavo-
nia (1903), political dominance of the Croat-Serb Coalition (Hrvatsko-srpska 
koalicija – HSK) (from 1906), the rapture with political and social traditions, 
pervasiveness with a trend to expand, of yugoslavist ideology, and the pres-
ence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in view of its annexation by the 
monarchy (1908) as nemesis of Croatian political life.
After Khuen was nominated the minister President of Hungary and af-
ter he left a long tenure as the Ban of Croatia, a political void was left after 
him. The party he had used for the implementation of his autocratic policy, 
People’s Party (Narodna stranka), also disappeared from the political scene. 
The Croatian Independent Party (Hrvatska neovisna stranka), known also as 
Strossmayer’s Party, dwindled down to a group of soul-mates around the Za-
greb daily Obzor, and were called Obzoraši. On the opposite end of ideological 
spectrum were Rightists (the Party of [State] Right - Domovinaši and the Pure 
Party of [State] Right – Frankovci).1 Brothers Antun and Stjepan Radić in de-
cember 1904 formed the Croatian Popular and Peasant Party (Hrvatska pučka 
seljačka stranka),2 but it was more an ideological, almost missionary project 
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than a political party, whereby the peasants, the downtrodden people, are to be 
raised to the status of central political force.
The paucity of political activity was amply replenished with ideological 
confusion. The newly educated youth returned from European universities, es-
pecially Prague, and were ready to knock down "idols" and "authorities" of the 
"olds" and were in favor of everything modern (Croatian modernism).3 They 
organized themselves into informal grouping of Progressive Youth (Napredna 
omladina - Naprednjaci). They were inimically disposed to Frankovci as bas-
tions of traditional politics and traditional Croatian nationalism.4  
The first political fruition of this ideological burgeoning happened in dal-
matia and it was formulated as a new program of a newly created political party, 
Croatian Party (Hrvatska stranka), in April 1905, called the "new course". The 
newness consisted of radical turn-around from traditional Croatian political 
values: instead of Croatian nationalism, readiness to recognize ethnic Serbs as 
"political people" in Croatia was emphasized. Of course, the turn-around was a 
reflection of political realism. faced with Italian pressures and the heightening 
of Italian irredentism, Croatian politicians in dalmatia had to look for alli-
ances that would effectively repulse Italian pressures. 
On the crest of the "new course" wave on 3 October 1905 the Rijeka Reso-
lution (Riječka rezolucija) was signed. Croatian politicians from dalmatia and 
banian Croatia, except J. frank, expressed their readiness for political co-op-
eration and harmony with Croatia’s Serbs, and for the support of Hungarian 
opposition to achieve Hungary’s full independence. In return, the signatories 
of the Resolution expected an equally unhesitant support of Hungarian poli-
ticians for unification of all Croat lands.5 On 17 October 1905, the Serb rep-
resentatives from banian Croatia and dalmatia signed the Zadar Resolution 
(Zadarska rezolucija), approving of the “new course” policy, with an important 
stipulation that they should be recognized in Croatia as people, and not just a 
minority group. Croat politicians agreed with that condition.6 A year later, the 
Croat-Serb Coalition (Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija –HSK) - the Croatian Party of 
Rights, the Croatian Progressive Party, the Serb People’s Independent Party, 
the Serb People’s Radical Party and, temporarily, the Social democrat Party – 
for the first time won the election and thus began a long-lasting tenure.7
Politicians who did not share newly installed ideology detected inherent 
political pitfalls in the "new course" politics. Indeed, mere political rhetoric 
3  milan marjanović, Hrvatska Moderna (Zagreb, 1951); Ante Kadić, "Thomas g. masaryk and 
the Croats," Journal of Croatian Studies, vol. 28-29, 1987-88, pp. 81-102.
4  Ivan Peršić, Kroničarski spisi, ed. by Stjepan matković (Zagreb: državni arhiv u Zagrebu – 
dom i svijet – Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002), p. 149. 
5  Ibid., pp. 273-274.
6  m. gross, Vladavina hrvatsko-srpske koalicije 1906-1907 (Beograd, 1960), passim. 
7  Josip Horvat, Politička povijest Hrvatske, pp. 276-277.
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indicated a political course that represented a radical rupture with traditional 
Croatian politics and rhetoric.  In the Coalition’s manifest, there was not a word 
of the Croatian nation, but only of "our people of Croatian and Serb name". Ex-
pectedly, frank’s Pure Party of (State) Right in banian Croatia and Ivo Prodan’s 
Party of (State) Right in dalmatia did not accept the "new course" policy and 
did not join the Croat-Serb Coalition. They distrusted Hungarian politicians as 
much as they detested Serbs' idea of greater Serbia, which they detected in the 
yugoslavist ideology and the propaganda about the unity of Croats and Serbs.8 
frank thought of Hungarians – supposed partners of the Coalition - as incur-
able chauvinists and megalomaniacs, and thus inappropriate political partners. 
He was soon to be justified, when Hungarian government enacted the law on 
the introduction of the Hungarian language in the rail traffic in Croatia.9 frank 
believed neither in the ideology of brotherhood with Serbs or in the Slavic mu-
tuality. He even considered those ideas to be nebulous.10 Frankovci manifested 
their disapproval with such policy by stirring up civil unrest. A number of ar-
ticles in frank’s Hrvatsko pravo under a pseudonym "Argus" accused signatories 
of the Rijeka Resolution, especially frano Supilo, to have been hired by Serbian 
government to propagate Serbian interests.11 frank believed that a more reli-
able political partner for Croats is vienna, and not Pesta. The responsibility of 
Croatian politics, he believed, was to convince the Crown that failure to satisfy 
Croatian aspirations might be fatal for the monarchy.  He was also convinced 
that he can achieve that goal through the general Staff. S. Radić did not join 
the Coalition either; he stood up against the spirit and the letter of the Rijeka 
Resolution and the politics arising from it. Neither did the Istrian Croats join the 
Coalition, because they did not believe that co-operation with the Italians, which 
the Resolution also called for, would be possible.12 
Bosnia and herzegovina as a test case
Another important element of the Progressive youth should be mentioned 
- their antagonism towards the Catholic clergy and towards the Church. The 
Church was perceived to be opposed to the idea of "Slavic mutuality" (slavenska 
uzajamnost) and the Naprednjaci intended to replace the traditional Catholic 
Church with "people’s church", i.e. the Catholic Church that would be separat-
ed from Rome and organized so that it resembles the Serb Orthodox Church. 
They fiercely criticized the Catholic Church for its conservatism and, as they 
claimed, strong influence on the social life of Croats, which was supposedly the 
8  Ivo Perić, Povijest Hrvata (Zagreb, 1997), p. 206.
9  Tomislav macan, Povijest hrvatskoga naroda (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod matice Hrvatske and 
školska knjiga,1992), p. 381.
10  Ivan Peršić, Kroničarski spisi, pp. 153-154.
11  Josip Horvat, Politička povijest Hrvatske, p. 282.
12  Hrvoje matković-drago Trumbetaš, Mala ilustrirana hrvatska povijest (Zagreb: Naklada 
Pavičić, 2001), pp. 230-234.
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cause of many Croatia’s problems. The Progressive’s paper was a vociferous op-
ponent of “clericalism” in Croatian society, which supposedly could be found 
in culture and politics.13 Progressives were, therefore, adamant opponents and 
critics of Bishop Antun mahnić's Catholic movement and its followers.14 
The anti-Catholic disposition of the Progressive youth stridently came out 
in connection with political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As is 
known, at the vienna Congress (1878) the Austro-Hungarian monarchy got 
the mandate to rule Bosnia and Herzegovina and establish peace there. Soon 
the region was administered by the combined ministry of the finances of the 
dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The occupation also brought about the 
ecclesiastical reorganization and the assignment of Zagreb professor Josip Sta-
dler (1882-1918) Archbishop of vrhbosna, based in Sarajevo. for a long time 
Croatian politicians, especially those that shared Ante Starčević's state rights 
position, held that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Croatian land. Archbishop 
Stadler and majority of franciscans of the land shared that view and hoped 
that the expected annexation by the monarchy would precipitate integration 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina with banian Croatia. Thus, ideological and political 
developments in Croatia and dalmatia and politics of the Croat-Serb Coali-
tion in Croatia militated against their hopes and political goals. The Coalition 
based its program on the reliance on ethnic Serbs, whereas they had to fight 
with Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the loyalty of the muslims and, ul-
timately, for the decision about the future of that land. The Archbishop and 
franciscans knew that the Coalition relinquished the idea that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a Croatian land as a concession to Croatian Serbs.15 
To offset such political developments, the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina in summer of 1906 founded the religious and cultural organization, Croa-
tian National Community (Hrvatska narodna zajednica - HNZ) in dolac near 
Travnik. The general Committee members were only laymen: Nikola mandić, 
Jozo Sunarić, Stjepan Kukrić, Ivo Pilar and Đuro džamonja. The political mes-
sage of the HNZ, contained in its Bylaws, was clear: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is a Croat land and its inhabitants naturally tend to unite with the Kingdom of 
Croatia, its muslim citizens are "indubitably Croats", who will be "organized 
apart" due to specific circumstances.16 
13  većeslav Wilder, “O stranačkoj štampi,” Hrvatski Pokret, 3 (1906), no. 130; “što je klerikal-
izam,” Ibid, no. 119.
14  Jure Krišto, Prešućena povijest. Katolička crkva u hrvatskoj politici, 1850-1918 (Zagreb: 
Sveučilišna naklada, 1994), passim.
15  m. gross, "Liberalizam i klerikalizam u hrvatskoj povijesti (19. i početak 20. stoljeća)," Naše 
teme, 31 (1987): 6-7, pp. 846-858; for a different viewpoint see: Jure Krišto, Prešućena povijest; 
Idem, "Nadbiskup Josip Stadler u svjetlu naprednjačkog tiska (1904.-1918.)," Časopis za suvre-
menu povijest 31 (1999): 1, pp. 29-50; Stjepan matković, Čista stranka prava, passim.
16  m. gross, "Hrvatska politika u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1878. do 1914.," Historijski zbornik 
19-20 (1966-1967): 1-4, p. 26; Zoran grijak, Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa 
Stadlera, (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest–dom i svijet, 2000), p. 178.
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However, the Croat-Serb Coalition began to win followers in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, even within the Croatian National Community (I. Pilar, N. 
mandić, and franciscans). At the same time Serbian propaganda intensified 
after the king milan Obrenović of Serbia, the holder of the pro-Austrian policy, 
in June 1903 was murdered. The  Karađorđević dynasty immediately adopted 
the pro-Russian policy. Those developments were matched by antimonarchist 
activities of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and an intensified propagan-
da that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a Serb land and that muslims are Serbs. At 
the same time, the Catholic Croats were increasingly presented as reactionary 
element, Catholic Church, especially Archbishop Stadler, as proselytes eager 
to convert muslims to Catholicism. Bosnian Serbs received more than gener-
ous help from Croatian Progressives and the Croat-Serb Coalition in spreading 
such propaganda. In fact, the daily Pokret, sponsored by the Progressives, was 
the fiercest critic of Archbishop Stadler. The standard menu of their critique 
was that Stadler equated Croathood with Catholicism, which supposedly alien-
ated Croat Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina from muslims and Orthodox 
Serbs. moreover, Stadler alone was to blame for his conflict with the Bosnian 
and Herzegovinian franciscans.17
under such propaganda, Pilar, mandić, and franciscans distanced them-
selves even further from Archbishop Stadler, which inevitably lead to the split 
of the HNZ. In february 1908, Stadler refused to approve the Bylaws.18 The 
Archbishop apparently was against the inter-confessional organization, prefer-
ring that muslims and Catholics organize themselves apart and then join their 
efforts in common political projects. He requested that the Bylaws should re-
flect that position and, thus, "reserve" the membership for Catholics alone.19 Af-
ter the HNZ leadership refused to accommodate the Archbishop,20 in July 1909 
he made moves to organize an alternative Croatian organization for Catholics, 
Croatian Catholic Association (Hrvatska katolička udruga – HKu).
In the meantime, on 6 October 1908, the monarchy annexed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and, thus, after three centuries of Ottoman dominance, rejoined 
it to the western civilization.21 Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina generally ap-
proved the annexation, hoping that the country would be joined to Croatia. 
17  “Stadler i Jeglič’, Hrvatski pokret 5 (1908: 238, p. 6. for more details, see: J. Krišto, “Nadbiskup 
Josip Stadler u svjetlu naprednjačkog tiska”. 
18  Luka djaković, Političke organizacije bosanskohercegovačckih katolika Hrvata, sv. 1: do ot-
varanja Sabora 1910 (Zagreb, 1985), pp. 271-275.
19  “šta hoćemo u H.N.Z?”, Vrhbosna 23 (1909): 2, p. 31.; L. djaković, Političke organizacije, pp. 
271-275, 284-286.
20  Ibid., p. 288. 
21  Andrew Rossos, Rusija i Balkan. Međubalkanska rivalstva i ruska vanjska politika 1908-1914. 
(Zagreb: globus, 1922), passim.
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However, that approval was not shared by some prominent Croatian politi-
cians in Croatia, members of the Croat-Serb Coalition; frano Supilo was one 
of the most vociferous opponents.22
croats and the reformation of the monarchy -    
The Debate over the may Declaration
The lack of common political purpose among politicians could not guaran-
tee prosperous future either to Croats in Croatia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
But the obstinacy of monarchical political circles to heed basic Croatian wishes 
was even a greater problem, which frustrated all Croatian political parties, re-
gardless of ideological preferences. Indeed, there was no lack of Croatian politi-
cians in the period leading to World War I who put forward proposals for the 
reformation of the monarchy, which would realize the unification of the Croat 
lands.
One of the proposals came from the Croatian Starčević Party of (State) 
Right, or Milinovci, and the Slovene politicians Rev. Janez Evanđelist Krek and 
Rev. Anton Korošec; it aimed at the reconstruction of the monarchy so that 
its Croat and Slovene population would unify on the basis of the Croat state 
rights, but would remain under the Habsburg dynasty.23 Before he was assas-
sinated in Sarajevo, they believed that they had the support of the Archduke 
francis ferdinand. The other proposal also came from the rightist tradition of 
Croatian politics – the Pure Party of (State) Right (Čista stranka prava – Frank-
ovci). Their proposal gave priority to the unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with Croatia-Slavonia, with the unification of Slovenes with Croats second in 
importance.24
The Croatian political and cultural mainstream, however, was impregnated 
with ideas of yugoslavism, nourished by ideology that posited that Croats and 
Serbs are, like their languages, one and same people, and hoped for creation 
of a yugoslav state. By the time of the beginning of World War I, most of the 
membership of the Catholic movement's organizations felt a deep ideological 
kinship with the rest of Croatia’s intellectual and political elite.25 On the crest 
of those ideological waves, and not without prodding from the Serbian gov-
ernment, sailed the Croatian self-made representatives of the will of Croatian 
22  for further details see: J. Krišto, "Kad pravaši pođu različitim putovima: frano Supilo i Josip 
frank o 'novom kursu'", Pravaška misao i politika. Zbornik radova, ed. by Jasna Turkalj, Zlatko 
matijević i Stjepan matković (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2007), pp. 143-165.
23  Stenografski zapisnici sabora Kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije i dalmacije (SZSKHSd), period 
1913-1918, vol. Iv, session 159 (march 5, 1917), pp. 850-851; A. Rahten, Savezništva i diobe. 
Razvoj slovensko-hrvatskih političkih odnosa u Habsburškoj monarhiji 1848.-1918. (Zagreb: 
golden marketing–Tehnička knjiga, 2007), pp. 205-212. 
24  SZSKHSd, 855. 
25  J. Krišto, Prešućena povijest, passim.
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people--Ante Trumbić, frano Supilo, Ivan meštrović, and Hinko Hinković.  In 
1915, they were joined by Serbian and Slovene politicians to found the Yugo-
slav Committee in London.26 The Committee advocated the disintegration of 
Austro-Hungary and the creation of a new South-Slavic state from its Slavic 
areas.
In the war (World War I), there was the conflict of interests of the countries 
of the Triple Alliance (germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy) and Allied powers 
(great Britain, france and Russia). As soon as the war broke out, Italy declared 
its neutrality, and on 26 April 1915, entered into the secret pact with the Allied 
powers (the Treaty of London) on taking part in the war on their side, as it 
was promised to get South Tyrol, gorizia, gradišće, Trieste, Istria and a larger 
part of dalmatia.27 Croats thus fought on three fronts: the Balkan front against 
Serbia, the East front against Russia, and the Soča front against Italy.
Such was the political and ideological context for the appearance of still 
another proposal for the reformation of the monarchy – that of the club of 
the south Slavic representatives in the Emperor's Council, the yugoslav Club. 
On may 30, 1917, the Club issued the declaration which also was based on 
Croatian state right; it called for the unification of the lands populated by Cro-
ats, Slovenes, and Serbs within the monarchy in one political body under the 
house of the Habsburgs.28 The may declaration was probably an attempt to 
provide an alternative to the program of the yugoslav Committee in London. 
However, its pithy message gave rise to a lively discussion which soon revealed 
the political and ideological preferences of the opposing groups within Croa-
tian circles.29 
The president of Starčević's Party of (State) Right, Ante Pavelić (the elder), 
praised the declaration,30 and the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan 
26  m. Paulova, Jugoslavenski odbor (Povijest jugoslavenske emigracije za svjetskog rata 1914.-
1918.) (Zagreb, 1925).
27  Ivo Perić, Povijest Hrvata, p. 209.
28  ferdo šišić, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914.-1919. (Zagreb, 
1920), p. 95. See also: dragoslav Janković, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krfska deklaracija 1917. god. 
(Beograd, 1967), pp.127-128; Zlatko matijević, Reakcije frankovačkih pravaša na «Svibanjsku 
deklaraciju» i njezine promicatelje (1917.-1918.), Prošlost obvezuje : povijesni korijeni Gospićko-
senjske biskupije: zbornik biskupa Mile Bogovića, ed. by franjo Emanuel Hoško, (Rijeka, 2004), 
pp. 439-474; A. Rahten, Savezništva i diob, pp. 205-212; dragovan šepić, Italija, saveznici i ju-
goslavensko pitanje 1914-1918 (Zagreb, 1970), pp. 232-233; momčilo Zečević, Slovenska ljudska 
stranka i jugoslovensko ujedinjenje 1917-1921. Od Majske deklaracije do Vidovdanskog ustava 
(Beograd, 1973), p. 81.
29  J. Krišto, Prešućena povijest, pp. 347-362; Z. matijević, Slom politike katoličkog jugoslaven-
stva. Hrvatska pučka stranka u političkom životu Kraljevine SHS (1919.-1929.) (Zagreb: Hrvatski 
institut za povijest – dom i svijet, 1998), pp. 57-69; Idem, Reakcije frankovačkih pravaša na 
“Svibanjsku deklaraciju”, pp. 443-473.
30  f. šišić, Dokumenti, 95.
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Radić, lauded it as the very expression of his political program,31 whereas the 
followers of the Pure Party of (State) Right criticized it as a sell-out of the his-
torical Croatian political right.32 Some frankists accused the leadership of the 
Slovene People's Party of treason.33 The Catholic Seniority (the leading body of 
the Croatian Catholic movement)34 and the Zagreb Archbishop Antun Bauer 
expressed support for the declaration.
A similar polarization occurred among the political parties in dalma-
tia. Rev. Ivo Prodan expressed strong support for the declaration35 while 
other Catholic priests criticized it as a deviation from the rightist program of 
1894.36
many Catholic priests were involved in the debate caused by the may dec-
laration, so it is not surprising that the historiography of the former yugosla-
via called the declaration itself a “clericalist” document, implying that clergy 
used religion for political purposes. However, the reason for such an opinion 
does not lie in the fact that many clerics were involved in the debate about the 
31  Stjepan Radić, “Temelji hrvatske pučke seljačke stranke, jugoslavenske deklaracije i krfskog 
programa,” Dom, Zagreb, 12 (1918): 4, p. 2. more in: Branka Boban, “Odnos hrvatske političke 
elite prema Svibanjskoj deklaraciji," Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara, vol. 4 (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 
314-318. On Radić's political activities during the WWI see: Bogdan Krizman, “Stjepan Radić 
i Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka u prvom svjetskom ratu”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 2 
(1970): 2, pp. 99-166.
32  SZSKHSd, period 1913-1918, vol. Iv, session 233 (may 15, 1918), p. 722; A. Rahten, 
Savezništva i diobe, p. 215. See also portions of Ivica frank's speech during the session of August 
8, 1917, cited in: B. Krizman, Hrvatska u Prvom svjetskom ratu. Hrvatsko-srpski politički odnosi 
(Zagreb, 1989), p. 137; Z. matijević, Reakcije frankovačkih pravaša na «Svibanjsku deklaraciju», 
pp. 448-449.
33  milan Kovačević, “Skokovi,” Hrvatska, 1917, no. 1828, p. 1; Z. matijević, Reakcije frankovačkih 
pravaša na “Svibanjsku deklaraciju”, p. 448. 
34  for differences among the Catholic Seniority see: Z. matijević, “Politička orijentacija dijela 
hrvatskih katoličkih seniora u Slavoniji od objavljivanja ‘Svibanjske deklaracije’ Jugoslavenskog 
kluba u Beču do osnutka Hrvatske pučke stranke (1917.-1919.) ,” Scrinia slavonica, 1 (2001), pp. 
193-216.
35  On the dalmatian rightist tradition see: Jaroslav šidak, mirjana gross, Igor Karaman i dra-
govan šepić, Povijest hrvatskog naroda g. 1860-1914. (Zagreb, 1968), pp. 167-169, 172-176; mir-
jana gross, “uloga šibenskog pravaštva u dalmatinskoj i općehrvatskoj pravaškoj politici uoči 
prvog svjetskog rata”, Radovi Instituta za hrvatsku povijest, 1 (1971), pp. 259-285; Idem, Povijest 
pravaške ideologije (Zagreb, 1973), pp. 287 and passim; marjan diklić, “mihovil Pavlinović i 
pojava pravaštva u dalmaciji,” Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti Jugoslavenske akademije 
znanosti i umjetnosti u Zadru, 37 (1989), pp. 15-43; Idem, “Pojava pravaštva i nastanak Stranke 
prava u dalmaciji”, Ibid., 32 (1990), pp. 5-107; Idem, “Prva konferencija ‘starčevićanaca’ u dal-
maciji”, Ibid., 34 (1992), pp. 181-195; Idem, “Stranka prava i Hrvatsko političko društvo koncem 
XIX. i na početku XX. stoljeća”, Ibid., 38 (1996), pp. 249-261.
36  See: NEKOLIKO SvEĆENIKA, “Svojevoljni sljepci. Nekoliko rieči povodom deklaracije Ju-
goslavenskog kluba,” Hrvatska, 1917, no. 1870, pp. 1-2; no. 1871, pp. 1-2; Z. matijević, Reakcije 
frankovačkih pravaša na «Svibanjsku deklaraciju», p. 450. On the rightist program of 1894 see: 
Stjepan matković, Čista stranka prava, pp. 39-55.
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declaration or that they misused their religion for political purposes. The real 
reason for such name-calling was the fact that a number of Catholic priests, 
especially the younger and members of the Croatian Catholic movement,37 ad-
hered to the ideology of the Pure Party of the (State) Right and thus could not 
accept any form of yugoslavism. As an ardent follower of Starčević's ideology, 
Rev. Stipe vučetić, considered the may declaration like the serpent on the tree 
in Paradise, tempting Croats to choose evil instead of good.38 So even though 
some clerical circles interpreted the may declaration in the sense of yugoslav 
integration, its acceptance or rejection did not depend on criteria devised by 
the Church. So it is not surprising that there was a substantial body of Catholic 
clerics, priests as bishops, who rejected the declaration because of adherence 
to the rightist ideology. Obviously, the adherence to the yugoslavist or rightist 
ideology was the reason for acceptance or rejection of the declaration, and the 
yugoslav historiography was motivated by still other ideological reasons (com-
munist) when it had labeled it “clericalist”. 
The Archbishop of Sarajevo is a case in point. He authorized Ivo Pilar 
and Josip vancaš to submit to Emperor Karl a memorandum asking that the 
Croatian Kingdom be unified with Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the new 
Croatian state become a condominium of Austria and Hungary, headed by 
a member of the Habsburg dynasty who was to be nominated by the King.39 
Stadler's circle made its political position public on November 16, 1917 in a 
Pronouncement that Croatia, Slavonia, dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Istria unite in a politically and financially independent state body, perma-
nently associated with the Habsburg monarchy.40
given Stadler's status in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well 
as his uneasy relationship to local franciscans and their circle of politicians, it 
is not surprising that Stadler's Pronouncement had a divisive effect. Indeed, 
all those that adhered to the yugoslav ideology (the franciscans of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; the followers of mahnić's Catholic movement, including almost 
all religious orders except the Jesuits; the Zagreb Archbishop A. Bauer; and 
37  On the Croatian Catholic movement, see: ???????
38  S. vučetić, “Značaj jugoslavenske propagande,” Hrvatska, 1918, no. 2081, p. 1; Z. matijević, 
Reakcije frankovačkih pravaša na «Svibanjsku deklaraciju», p. 471.
39  L. v. Südland (Ivo Pilar), Die südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg (Wien 1918), pp. 751-757; 
See: Luka djaković, Položaj Bosne i Hercegovine u austrougarskim koncepcijama rješenja jugo-
slavenskog pitanja 1914-1918. (Tuzla, 1980), p. 156; Hamdija Kapidžić, “Austro-ugarska politika 
u Bosni i Hercegovini i jugoslovensko pitanje za vrijeme prvog svjetskog rata,” Godišnjak Is-
torijskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine, 9 (1957), pp. 26-27; Z. matijević, Reakcije frankovačkih 
pravaša na «Svibanjsku deklaraciju», p. 452.
40  Hrvatski dnevnik, 12 (1917): 263, p. 1. The signers in: “Tko je potpisao izjavu?”, Novine, 
4 (1917): 284, p. 2.; Bosnische Post, 20 (November 1917); Z. matijević, Reakcije frankovačkih 
pravaša na «Svibanjsku deklaraciju», pp. 454-455; See also: “Na obranu hrvatstva!”, Hrvatski 
dnevnik, 12 (1917): 263, p. 1.
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I. Prodan's followers in dalmatia)41 distanced themselves from Stadler's Pro-
nouncement. Only priests who supported frank's political party, joined by S. 
Radić, who normally opposed the Croatian Party of (State) Rights program, 
approved of Stadler's political course.42
It is not excluded that by the Pronouncement Stadler intended to coun-
teract still another declaration, the Corfu Declaration, which members of the 
emigrant group (yugoslav Committee) signed on the island of Corfu with the 
leading Serbian politicians Nikola Pašić on 20 July 1917 and which called for 
the unification of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes.43 Although the Corfu declara-
tion was not unanimously welcomed in Croatia, especially by S. Radić, the 
mainstream of Croatian political and cultural life was inclined to the idea of 
the unification. That became evident when the National Council of Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs (Narodno vijeće Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba – Nv SHS) was 
established on 5-6 October 1918 in Zagreb. The politics of the Nv SHS took a 
definite course after the Croatian-Serbian Coalition entered the Council and 
gained predominance in it. Slovene Anton Korošec was elected the president, 
and the vice-presidents were Croat Ante Pavelić, senior, and Croatian Serb 
Svetozar Pribićević. The National Council did not accept King Karl’s mani-
fest on the reorganization of the monarchy into a federation of independent 
nations. On the contrary, on 29 October 1918, the Croatian Parliament sus-
pended all connections of the Croatian nation with Hungary and Austria, and 
transferred its authority to the National Council. The Parliament also declared 
the new state community – the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.44 
conclusions
Several conclusions seem to be in order. 
first, Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been the critical problem of Cro-
41  See: f. šišić, Dokumenti, p. 105; “Izjava,” Novine, 4 (1917): 286, p. 1.; Z. matijević, Reakcije 
frankovačkih pravaša na «Svibanjsku deklaraciju», p. 457; “Istrani protiv štadlerove izjave,” 
Hrvatska riječ (1917): 351, p. 1; “Izjava nadbiskupa Stadlera,” Hrvatska Kruna (1917): 88, p. 
1; Z. matijević, Reakcije frankovačkih pravaša na «Svibanjsku deklaraciju», p. 457; J. Krišto, 
Prešućena povijest, p. 355.
42  “Izjava povjerenja nadbiskupu dru. Stadleru,” Hrvatska (1917): 1931, p. 1; Stjepan markužić, 
“Na poruku vlč. gg. kolege Jemeršića i Turzana,” Hrvatska (1918): 1969, p. 1; “Preuzvišenom 
gospodinu dru. Josipu Stadleru nadbiskupu vrhbosanskom itd. u Sarajevu”, Hrvatska (1917): 
1921, p. 1. The politicians that supported Stadler were: dr. Aleksandar Horvat, dr. Ivo frank, 
dr. vuk pl. Kiš, Josip milković, Rev. fran Novak, Rev. Stjepan Pavunić, Rev. dr. Josip Pazman, 
pop matija Polić, dr. vladimir Prebeg, pop Stipe pl. vučetić, Ivan Zatluka, Rev. Stjepan Zago-
rac, Jalžabetić, vinko Lovreković, and Stjepan Radić, see: Z. matijević, Reakcije frankovačkih 
pravaša na “Svibanjsku deklaraciju”, pp. 457-458.
43  Tomislav macan, Povijest hrvatskoga naroda, p. 387.
44  šišić et al., Povijest hrvatskog naroda, pp. 179-180; Tomislav macan, Povijest hrvatskoga nar-
oda, p. 388. See Z. matijević's article in this issue of the RCH.
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atian politics and the key for resolving the Croatian puzzle. That was the case 
at the beginning of the 20th century and that is the case today. However, no po-
litical problem has caused so much disagreement among Croatian politicians 
as the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Parties that made up the Croat-Serb 
Coalition, the leadership of the Croatian Catholic movement, many Catholic 
bishops, and the Croatian intellectual elite had tended to relinquish the prob-
lem of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina to others – the Austro-Hungar-
ian monarchy, the Kingdom of Serbia, or some other international actor. The 
adherence, clerical and secular, to the ideology of the Party of (State) Right, 
especially its "radical" branch, the Pure Party of Right, had envisaged the uni-
fication of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the rest of Croatian lands not only as 
a solution to the question of the future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but 
to that of Croatia and to the question of the reorganization of the monarchy 
as well.
Second, a constant thread has run through Croatian politics and ideologi-
cal controversy for over a century -- a complaint regarding the influence of 
clericalism. That usually meant either that a disproportionately large presence 
of Catholic clergy was actively involved in Croatian culture and politics or that 
there was a misuse of the (Catholic) faith for political purposes. However, the 
debate caused by the may declaration and later by Stadler's Pronouncement 
demonstrates that the real problem was not whether one was a member of the 
clergy and, thus, supposedly prone to use religion for political gain, but rather 
whether one was an adherent of the ideology of yugoslavism or against it. 
Third, the majority of Catholic clergy in Croatia, including the bishops, 
has adopted the yugoslavist ideology and the program of those Croatian poli-
ticians who worked on the unification of Croatia with the kingdoms of Serbia 
and montenegro; hence, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes no is-
sue.
yugoslavism apparently is the fruit on the Croatian tree that the serpent 
temped Croatian politicians to taste. 
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Dem guten oder dem bösen engel zuhörend: die maideklaration aus 
dem Jahre 1917 und der Zusammenbruch der mitteleuropäischen 
monarchie
Zusammenfassung
drei Jahre nach dem Kriegsbeginn, am 30. mai 1917, beschloss der Jugo-
slawische Klub der Abgeordneten im Wiener Reichsrat die maideklaration, 
in der er die vereinigung aller mit Slowenen, Kroaten und Serben besiedelten 
gebiete des Österreich-ungarns in einen selbständigen Staat forderte, jedoch 
unter dem Zepter der Habsburger. diese forderung basierte auf dem nation-
alen Prinzip und auf dem kroatischen Staatsrecht.
die maideklaration rief Kontroversen unter kroatischen Politikern und 
politischen Parteien hervor, gleichzeitig aber begann auch die Bewegung zur 
Annahme des Programms der deklaration. die eifrigsten Befürworter waren 
die Spitzenleute und mitglieder katholischer Organisationen.
Autor analysiert die politische Situation, die zur formulierung der dekla-
ration führte, Kontroversen über die öffentliche Präsentation der deklaration 
sowie die von ihr verursachten politischen folgen. die maideklaration bildete 
wahrscheinlich keinen entscheidenden faktor im Prozess der Zerstörung der 
großen monarchie und in der Bildung des ersten jugoslawischen Staates, trug 
aber sicherlich dazu im hohen maße bei.
